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Abstract
We show how to infer deterministic cache replacement poli-
cies using off-the-shelf automata learning and program syn-
thesis techniques. For this, we construct and chain two ab-
stractions that expose the cache replacement policy of any
set in the cache hierarchy as a membership oracle to the
learning algorithm, based on timing measurements on a sil-
icon CPU. Our experiments demonstrate an advantage in
scope and scalability over prior art and uncover two previ-
ously undocumented cache replacement policies.
Keywords Cache Replacement Policies, Automata Learn-
ing, Program Synthesis, Reverse Engineering
1 Introduction
Understanding the timing behavior of modern CPUs is cru-
cial for optimizing code and for ensuring timing-related se-
curity and safety properties. Examples of such properties are
bounds on programs’ worst-case execution time [41] or on
the amount of information leaked via timing [9, 13]. Unfor-
tunately, the timing behavior of today’s high-performance
processors depends on subtle and poorly documented details
of their microarchitecture, which has triggered laborious ef-
forts to build models of different components [4, 19, 27, 30].
Cache replacement policies have received specific atten-
tion [1, 2, 8, 33, 42], because they control the content of the
memory hierarchy and hence heavily influence execution
time. Detailed policymodels are used inworst-case execution
time analyzers [5], CPU simulators [7], and for improving
microarchitectural attacks and defenses [8, 9, 13].
However, only few authors have approached the problem
of inferring replacement policies in a principled way.
• Rueda [33] uses off-the-shelf techniques for learning
register automata to infer cache replacement policies. The
approach learns replacement policies with small state-spaces
from noiseless simulator traces, but it has not been success-
fully applied to actual hardware.
• Abel and Reineke [1] present an approach that infers
so-called permutation-based replacement policies, which in-
clude LRU, FIFO, and PLRU [15]. The approach has been
used to infer policies from hardware performance counter
measurements on hardware. However, permutation-based
policies are restrictive in that they do not include impor-
tant examples such as MRU [26], SRRIP [21], or the policies
implemented in the lower-level caches of recent Intel CPUs.
Furthermore, both approaches share a drawback: the in-
ferred policies are not easily interpretable by humans.
Approach. In this paper we propose an approach for learn-
ing cache replacement policies that goes beyond the state-of-
the-art in that it (1) can learn arbitrary deterministic policies
(2) from real-time (or performance counter) measurements
on silicon CPUs. Moreover, we show how to (3) apply pro-
gram synthesis to yield human-readable interpretations of
the inferred policies.
Our approach relies on two contributions that enable us
to leverage off-the-shelf automata learning tools [20, 35] for
attacking the problem:
• A tool, called CacheQuery, that provides an abstract
interface to any individual cache set within the cache hierar-
chy1 of a silicon CPU. With CacheQuery, users can specify
a cache set (say: set 63 in the L2 cache) and a pattern of mem-
ory accesses (say: A B C A B C), and they receive as output a
sequence (say: Miss Miss Miss Hit Hit Hit) representing
the hits and misses produced when performing a sequence of
memory loads to addresses that are mapped into the specified
cache set and that follow the specified pattern. CacheQuery
liberates the user from dealing with intricate details such
as the virtual-to-physical memory mapping, cache slicing,
set indexing, interferences from other levels of the cache hi-
erarchy, and measurement noise, and thus enables civilized
interactions with an individual cache set. See Figure 1c.
• An algorithm, called Polca, that provides an abstract in-
terface to the cache replacement policy based on an interface
to a cache set, such as CacheQuery. Polca translates inputs
to the replacement policy (which refer to the cache lines) into
inputs to the cache set (which refer to the memory blocks
that are stored in it). To achieve this, Polca itself keeps track
of the current cache content, e.g., by issuing queries to the
cache interface to determine which block has been evicted
in a miss. Polca exploits the data-independence symmetry
1For a primer on hardware caches, see § 2.1.
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(a) LearnLib [35] issues member-
ship queries to the system under
learning (SUL). The salient feature
of our approach is that the language
of the SUL refers to cache lines and
not to the cache content. When the
learning loop terminates, our tool
returns an automaton describing
the cache replacement policy under
learning.
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(b) Polca translates a sequence of re-
quests for cache lines Ln(i) or evictions
Evct into sequences of abstract memory
blocks. For this, the algorithm keeps track
of the current cache state (here: blocks
A/B in lines 0/1). Evct spawns multiple se-
quences that first produce a cache miss
(here: C), followed by accesses to all previ-
ously contained blocks to infer which line
was evicted (here: 0).
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(c) CacheQuery receives as input sequences of
abstract blocks (e.g., A B C A) and translates them
into distinct concrete memory blocks (e.g., Amaps
to address f30) that all map into the same cache
set. It loads the corresponding memory blocks,
counts the corresponding clock cycles, and re-
turns for each load whether it was a cache hit
(e.g., the 4c measurement maps to Hit) or a miss.
Figure 1. Leveraging Polca and CacheQuery to learn a toy replacement policy of a 2-way set associative CPU cache.
of the replacement policy that would otherwise have to be
inferred by the learning algorithm, and it is key to making
automata learning work in this domain. See Figure 1b.
We use Polca as a so-called membership oracle for the
replacement policy to be learned from an abstract cache
set (which can be implemented by CacheQuery or by a
software-simulated cache). The oracle provides an interface
to libraries such LearnLib [35], which enables us to lever-
age the state-of-the-art in automata learning for inferring
replacement policies of silicon CPUs. We give formal relative
completeness guarantees for the learned policies, based on
the correctness of Polca and LearnLib. The full learning
pipeline is depicted in Figure 1.
Finally, we show how to use program synthesis to auto-
matically derive a higher-level representation of the learned
replacement policy. The main component of our synthesis
step is a program template for replacement policies, which
we base on concepts used to describe replacement policies
in the microarchitecture community [21]. By combining the
policy template with a set of constraints derived from the
learned automaton, we can rely on off-the-shelf synthesis
solvers to synthesize high-level policy representations [34].
Evaluation. We evaluate our approach in 3 case studies:
1. We evaluate the scalability of learning replacement
policies with Polca. To this end, we learn a comprehensive
set of deterministic policies (including FIFO, LRU, PLRU [15],
MRU [26], LIP [31], and different variants of SRRIP [21])
from the noiseless hit-miss traces produced by a software-
simulated cache. Our experiments demonstrate that Polca
enables LearnLib to infer policies with state-spaces of more
than 2 orders of magnitude larger than what was reported
for direct applications of LearnLib to simulator traces [33].
2. We evaluate the effectiveness of learning with Polca
andCacheQuery on the L1, L2, and L3 caches of three recent
Intel CPUs. Our experiments show that we can effectively
learn cache replacement policies up to associativity 8 from
timing measurements on modern CPUs. While some of the
policies were known, we do uncover 2 policies that have not
yet been documented in the literature.
3. We evaluate our template-based synthesis approach
by synthesizing programs for 8 out of 9 different policies
(obtained from both the simulators and silicon CPUs), for
a fixed associativity 4. This allows us to provide high-level
descriptions for the 2 previously undocumented policies.
Summary of Contributions. In summary, we present a
practical end-to-end solution for inferring deterministic cache
replacement policies using off-the-shelf techniques for au-
tomata learning and program synthesis. The enabling contri-
bution is a chain of two abstractions that exposes a member-
ship oracle to the cache replacement policy, based on timing
measurements on a silicon CPU.
Our tools, CacheQuery and Polca, are available, together
with the learned models and synthesized programs, at https:
//github.com/cgvwzq/cachequery/ and https://github.com/
cgvwzq/polca/ respectively. Persistently archived full reposi-
tories for our tools are available at [38, 39].
2 Modeling Caches and Policies
In this section we present our model of hardware caches. A
key feature, inspired by [10], is that we distinguish between
the replacement policy (§ 2.2), which determines the cache
lines to be replaced, and the cache itself (§ 2.3), which stores
and retrieves memory blocks (according to the replacement
policy). We start by introducing necessary background.
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2.1 A Primer on Hardware Caches
Caches are fast but small memories that bridge the latency
gap between the CPU and the main memory. To profit from
spatial locality and to reduce management overhead, the
main memory is logically partitioned into a set of blocks.
Each block is cached as a whole in a cache line of the same
size. When accessing a block, the cache logic determines
whether the block is stored in the cache (a cache hit) or not
(a cache miss). For this purpose, caches are partitioned into
equally sized cache sets. The capacity of a set-associative
cache set is called associativity (or ways) and represents the
number of lines per set. Because the cache is smaller than
the main memory, upon a cache miss, a replacement policy
must decide which memory block to evict in order to make
room for the more recent block.
In this work, we consider n-way set associative caches, i.e.,
caches where all cache sets consist of n lines, and we focus
on individual cache sets. For brevity’s sake, in the following
we refer to a set of an n-way cache simply as an n-way cache.
2.2 Replacement Policy Model
We model the replacement policy of a cache set as a deter-
ministic, finite-state Mealy machine that accepts inputs of
the form Ln(i), for accessing the i-th cache line, and Evct,
for requesting a cache line to be freed (cf. Table 1). Given an
input, the policy updates its control state and outputs the
index of the line to be freed (or ⊥ otherwise).
Table 1. Policy and cache alphabets (associativity n)
Policy Cache
Input {Ln(0), . . . , Ln(n−1)} ∪ {Evct} Blocks
Output {⊥} ∪ {0, . . . ,n − 1} {Hit, Miss}
Definition 2.1. A replacement policy of associativity n ∈ N
is a Mealy machine ⟨CS, cs0, IP,OP,δ , λ⟩ consisting of:
• a finite set of control states CS;
• an initial control state cs0 ∈ CS;
• the set of inputs IP = {Ln(0), . . . , Ln(n − 1)} ∪ {Evct};
• the set of outputs OP = {⊥} ∪ {0, . . . ,n − 1};
• a transition function δ : CS × IP→ CS; and
• an output function λ : CS × IP→ OP.
We require that, (a) λ returns a value in {0, . . . ,n − 1} when
given the input Evct; and (b) λ returns ⊥ when given an
input in {Ln(0), . . . , Ln(n−1)}.
We write cs
⟨i,o⟩−−−→cs′ when δ (cs, i) = cs′ and λ(cs, i) = o.
We now introduce the trace semantics of policies, where
traces are sequences of input/output pairs. We use standard
sequence notation: S∗ is the set of finite sequences over
S , ε is the empty sequence, and s1 · s2 denotes sequence
concatenation. The trace semantics of a policy P (short: pol-
icy semantics) is the set JPK ⊆ (IP × OP)∗ of all sequences
⟨i1, o1⟩·⟨i2, o2⟩·. . .·⟨im, om⟩ for which there are control states
cs1, . . . , csm such that cs0
⟨i1,o1 ⟩−−−−−→cs1 ⟨i2,o2 ⟩−−−−−→ . . . ⟨im,om ⟩−−−−−→csm.
Example 2.2. Consider a Least Recently Used (LRU) replace-
ment policy, where the least recently used cache line is the
one to be evicted. The LRU policy with associativity 2 can
be formalized with the following Mealy Machine:
cs0 cs1⟨Ln(1),⊥⟩
⟨Ln(0),⊥⟩, ⟨Evct, 0⟩
⟨Ln(0),⊥⟩
⟨Ln(1),⊥⟩, ⟨Evct, 1⟩
There are two control states cs0 and cs1, where csi indicates
that line i is next to be evicted (i.e., i is the line storing the
least recently used memory block).
2.3 Cache Model
We model a cache of associativity n as a Labeled Transi-
tion System (LTS) that accepts as input elements b from a
potentially infinite set of memory blocks Blocks, and that
produces as output a Hit when block b is in the cache, and
a Miss otherwise (cf. Table 1).
Each state of the cache is a pair ⟨cc, cs⟩ consisting of the
cache content cc ∈ CCn , which is an n-tuple of memory
blocks without repetitions, and the control state cs of a re-
placement policy P. Formally:
Definition 2.3. An n-way cache induced by a policy P =
⟨CS, cs0, IP,OP,δ , λ⟩ is an LTS C(P, cc0,n) = ⟨S, s0, IC, OC,
=⇒⟩ consisting of:
• a set of cache states S = CCn × CS;
• an initial cache state s0 = ⟨cc0, cs0⟩ ∈ S;
• a set of inputs IC = Blocks;
• a set of outputs OC = {Hit, Miss};
• a transition relation =⇒ ⊆ S×IC×OC×S that is induced
by the policy P following Figure 2.
cc[i] = b cs ⟨Ln(i),⊥⟩−−−−−−→cs′
⟨cc, cs⟩ ⟨b,Hit⟩====⇒⟨cc, cs′⟩
Hit
∀i. cc[i] , b cs ⟨Evct, i⟩−−−−−→cs′
⟨cc, cs⟩ ⟨b,Miss⟩=====⇒⟨cc[i 7→ b], cs′⟩
Miss
Figure 2. Transition relation for a cache =⇒ given that of a
replacement policy −→. Here, cc[i] denotes the block stored
in cc’s i-th line and cc[i 7→ b] the cache content obtained
by replacing the block in the i-th line with b.
The cache’s transition relation relies on two rules, see
Fig. 2:
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The rule Hit captures what happens upon access to a
block that is cached: The rule (1) determines that b is stored
in cc’s i-th line, and (2) updates the control state by executing
the policy with input Ln(i).
The rule Miss captures what happens upon access to a
block that is not cached: The rule (1) checks that the block b
is not in the cache, (2) determines the line i of the block to
evict by executing the policy with input Evct, and (3) inserts
b in the i-th line and updates the cache state.
Note that the cache’s transition relation directly updates
only the cache content cc. Changes to the control state cs
are mediated by the replacement policy, which takes as in-
put only accesses to cache lines Ln(i) or eviction requests
Evct. Hence, updates to the control state are agnostic to the
accessed memory blocks.
Similarly to a policy’s semantics, we introduce a cache’s
semantics. The trace semantics of a cache C (short: cache se-
mantics) is the set JCK ⊆ (IC× OC)∗ of all sequences ⟨i1, o1⟩ ·
⟨i2, o2⟩·. . .·⟨im, om⟩ forwhich there are cache states s1, . . . , sm
such that s0
⟨i1,o1 ⟩
=====⇒s1
⟨i2,o2 ⟩
=====⇒ . . . ⟨im,om ⟩=====⇒sm.
Example 2.4. The LTS of the cache induced by the LRU
policy from Example 2.2 is as follows (we depict only part of
the infinite LTS for 3 abstract blocks A , B, and C):
⟨⟨A, B⟩, cs0⟩ ⟨⟨C, B⟩, cs1⟩
⟨⟨A, B⟩, cs1⟩ ⟨⟨A, C⟩, cs0⟩
⟨B, Hit⟩ ⟨C, Miss⟩
⟨A, Hit⟩
⟨A, Hit⟩ ⟨C, Miss⟩
⟨B, Hit⟩
Consider the cache state ⟨⟨A, B⟩, cs0⟩. Accessing the block B
produces a Hit since B is stored in line 1. Hence, we mod-
ify neither the cache content nor the control state because
cs0
⟨Ln(1),⊥⟩−−−−−−−→cs0 according to the policy. Accessing the block
A, which is stored in line 0, also produces a Hit. This time,
however, we update the control state since the least recently
used cache line is now 1, i.e., cs0
⟨Ln(0),⊥⟩−−−−−−−→cs1. In contrast,
accessing the block C, which is not in the cache, leads to a
Miss. The replacement policy determines that the block C
has to be stored in line 0, i.e., cs0
⟨Evct,0⟩−−−−−−→cs1, and the new
cache state is ⟨⟨C, B⟩, cs1⟩.
3 Polca: Learning Replacement Policies
In this section, we present our policy learning approach.
We begin by introducing background on automata learning
(§ 3.1). Next, we describe the two main components of our
learning approach, namely oracles for membership (§ 3.2)
and equivalence queries (§ 3.3) for replacement policies. Fi-
nally, we describe our prototype implementation of Polca
on top of LearnLib (§ 3.4).
3.1 A Primer on Automata Learning
The prevalent approach to learning automata follows the
student-teacher paradigm established by Angluin [6] and ex-
tended to Mealy machines by Niese [29]. There, the student’s
goal is to learn an unknown Mealy machine M by asking
queries to the teacher. There are two types of queries:
1. membership queries, where the student asks whether a
given trace belongs to the machineM , and
2. equivalence queries, where the student asks whether a
hypothesized Mealy machine H is (trace) equivalent toM .
Initially, the student knows only the input and output al-
phabets. By making a finite number of queries to the teacher
as prescribed by the learning algorithm, the student eventu-
ally learnsM .
We next show how to build oracles to answer member-
ship and equivalence queries for a replacement policy, based
on interactions with a hardware cache, which enables us to
leverage automata learning algorithms for inferring replace-
ment policies.
3.2 Membership Queries
We now present Polca, an algorithm that provides a mem-
bership oracle for a replacement policy, given a cache that
implements that policy. That is, Polca takes as input a trace
t of policy inputs and outputs, a cache C induced by a pol-
icy P, and it determines whether t ∈ JPK. For that, Polca
translates t into a series of input traces (i.e., sequences of
memory blocks) to the underlying cache C, by internally
keeping track of the blocks stored in the cache. From the
outputs of C, Polca then deduces whether t ∈ JPK.
By extracting the policy semantics JPK from the cache
semantics JCK, Polca effectively inverts the transition rules
in Figure 2. This enables learning only the policy P, rather
than learning also the data storage logic of the cache C, and
is key for scaling automata learning to hardware caches.
Algorithm. The pseudocode of Polca is given as Algo-
rithm 1. It receives as input an initial cache content cc0,
a policy trace t ∈ (IP × OP)∗, and the cache semantics JCK;
and it outputs true if t belongs to the policy semantics JPK,
and false otherwise.
Polca relies on the following helper functions:
• probeCache which, given a trace of blocks q and the
cache semantics JCK, accesses all blocks in q and returns
whether the last block produces Hit or Miss according to
the cache semantics JCK.
• mapInput which, given a policy input ip and a cache
content cc, maps ip to a memory block b. If ip is Ln(i), the
function returns cc[i]. Otherwise (i.e., ip is Evct), it returns
a block b not in cc.
• mapOutput which, given a cache output oc, a trace of
blocks q, a cache content cc, and the cache semantics JCK,
maps oc to the line containing the block that is evicted. If oc
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Algorithm 1 Polca: A membership oracle for policies
1: function Polca(cc0, t, JCK)
2: cc← cc0
3: for all i = 1, . . . , |t| do
4: let ⟨ip, op⟩ be t[i]
5: ic[i] ← mapInput(ip, cc)
6: oc← probeCache(ic[1 . . . i], JCK)
7: op′ ← mapOutput(oc, ic[1 . . . i], cc, JCK)
8: if op′ , ⊥ then ▷ Update cache content
9: cc← cc[op′ 7→ ic[i]]
10: if op , op′ then
11: return false
12: return true
13: function probeCache(q, JCK)
14: k ← |q|
15: let o be such that ⟨q[1], o[1]⟩ · . . . · ⟨q[k], o[k]⟩ ∈ JCK
16: return o[k]
17: function mapInput(ip, cc)
18: if ip ∈ {Ln(0), . . . , Ln(n − 1)} then
19: let i be such that ip = Ln(i)
20: return cc[i]
21: else ▷ ip = Evct
22: let b ∈ Blocks be such that cc[i] = b for no i
23: return b
24: function mapOutput(oc, q, cc, JCK)
25: if oc = Hit then
26: return ⊥
27: else ▷ oc = Miss
28: return findEvicted(q, cc, JCK)
29: function findEvicted(q, cc, JCK)
30: for all i = 1, . . . ,n do
31: if probeCache(q · cc[i], JCK) = Miss then
32: return i
is Hit, the function returns ⊥. Otherwise (i.e., oc is Miss), it
returns the line i where the evicted block was stored.
• findEvicted which, given a trace of blocks q, a cache
content cc, and the cache semantics JCK, determines which
line has been evicted by the last block in q. For that, the
function probes the cache with block traces q · cc[1], . . .,
q · cc[n] and determines which block resulted in Miss, i.e.,
the line that has been evicted by the last block in q.
We are now ready to describe Polca in detail: For each
pair ⟨ip, op⟩ ∈ t, the algorithm maps the input policy symbol
ip to a memory block b (mapInput call at line 5). Then, the
algorithm probes the cache to determine the result oc of
accessing b. Next, the cache output oc is mapped to an output
policy symbol op′ (mapOutput call at line 7). If op does not
match the computed op′, the algorithm returns false; else,
the algorithm moves to the next pair of input/output policy
symbols, and returns true when the sequence is entirely
processed.
For this, Polca keeps track of the sequence of blocks pro-
cessed so far (through the ic variable, which is updated
after every cache miss in line 9) and the sequence of blocks
processed so far (through the ic variable, which is updated
with every call to mapInput). ic is used to set the cache C
into the correct state before accessing the new block ic[i]
(line 6), and for identifying the cache line that was last evicted
(findEvicted function).
Correctness. Theorem 3.1 states that, given a cache C with
unknown policy P, Polca provides a sound, complete and
terminating oracle for P’s trace semantics.
Theorem 3.1. Let C be a cache of associativity n with initial
content cc0 ∈ CCn and policy P. Then, JPK = {t ∈ (IP×OP)∗ |
Polca(cc0, t, JCK) = true}.
As a corollary to Theorem 3.1, we obtain a language-
theoretic relationship between policies and caches. Propo-
sition 3.2 states that, once we fix the initial cache content
cc0 and associativity n, a replacement policy P uniquely
determines the corresponding cache C(P, cc0,n).
Proposition 3.2. Given two policies P and P′ of associativity
n ∈ N and an initial cache content cc0 ∈ CCn , then JPK = JP′K
iff JC(P, cc0,n)K = JC(P′, cc0,n)K.
Concretely, Proposition 3.2 provides a theoretical justifi-
cation for learning only the policy, since knowing the policy
is equivalent to knowing the cache behavior.
3.3 Equivalence Queries
Equivalence queries between two Mealy machines M and
M ′ are commonly implemented using conformance testing,
which relies on a test suite (TS) of membership queries: If
there is a membership query in TS on which M and M ′
disagree, the machines are clearly not equivalent. However,
there are Mealy machinesM for which there is no finite test
suite that demonstrates non-equivalence for all machinesM ′
with JMK , JM ′K. That is, the approximation of equivalence
queries using finite membership tests is not complete [28].
In our approach, we hence aim for a weaker notion of com-
pleteness due to [28]. Namely, for a parameterm we say that
a test suite TS ism-complete for a hypothesized policy H, if
there is no policy Pwith less thanm control states and JHK ,JPK, such that both H and P agree on the TS. With this, one
can obtain the following guarantees for the equivalence test.
Theorem 3.3. Let P be an unknown replacement policy, H a
hypothesized policy, and TS anm-complete test suite for H for
somem ∈ N. If P and H agree on all queries of TS then eitherJHK = JPK or P has more thanm states.
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We use existing algorithms, e.g. the Wp-Method [23], to
computem-complete suites for our hypothesized policy H.
3.4 Tool Implementation
We implement Polca in a Java prototype on top of the Learn-
Lib automata framework v0.14.0 [35]. This allows us to lever-
age state-of-the-art automata learning algorithms.
To access the cache semantics JCK, our tool interacts either
with a software-simulated cache or with CacheQuery when
targeting real hardware.
Concretely:
• for the membership oracle, we implement Polca, as
described in § 3.2.
• for the equivalence oracle, we rely on theWp-Method [23]
for computing test suites for conformance testing, as de-
scribed in § 3.3. Ideally, one would use am-complete TS for
H, form as large as possible. Unfortunately the cost of com-
putingm-complete test suite grows exponentially withm. To
achieve a good trade-off between completeness guarantees
and complexity, we rely on (|H|+k)-complete TS, for a small
constant k which we call the depth of the suite.
Our main learning loop uses the k-deep conformance test
for finding counterexamples. If the test fails, i.e., a coun-
terexample for the current hypothesis is found, we refine the
hypothesis and learning continues. Otherwise, the learning
terminates and we output the current hypothesis. At the end,
we get the following overall guarantees.
Corollary 3.4. If our learning approach with Polca, applied
to a cache C(P, cc0,n), returns a policy P′, then JPK = JP′K, or
P has more than |P′ | + k states.
To avoid cumbersome notation, from this point on we use
Polca to refer to both our algorithm and to our prototype
tool integrating the algorithm with the learning loop.
4 CacheQuery: An Interface to Hardware
Memory Caches
In this section we present CacheQuery, a tool for query-
ing silicon CPU caches. CacheQuery exposes an abstract
interface to individual cache sets, and it frees the user from
low-level details like slicing, mapping, virtual-to-physical
translation, and profiling. Concretely, CacheQuery provides
direct access to the trace semantics of hardware caches.
We first describe MemBlockLang, the domain-specific lan-
guage for specifying inputs to CacheQuery; then we de-
scribe CacheQuery’s architecture and discuss some of its
implementation challenges.
4.1 Domain Specific Language
We design MemBlockLang (MBL), a language that facilitates
the writing of queries to caches.
A query is a sequence of one or more memory operations.
Each memory operation is specified as a block from a finite,
ordered set of blocks Blocks, and it is decorated with an
optional tag from {?,!}. The tag ‘?’ indicates that the access
to the block should be profiled [16] to determine whether it
results in a cache hit or miss; the tag ‘!’ indicates that the
block should be invalidated (e.g., via clflush); and no tag
means that the block should just be accessed.
MBL features several macros that facilitate writing com-
mon query sequences:
• An expansion macro ‘@’ that produces a sequence of
associativity many different blocks in increasing order, start-
ing from the first element. For example, for associativity 8, @
expands to the sequence of blocks A B C D E F G H.
• A wildcard macro ‘_’ produces associativity many dif-
ferent queries, each one consisting of a different block. As
for ‘@’, blocks are chosen in alphabetical order. For example,
for associativity 8, _ expands to the set of queries {A, B, C, D,
E, F, G, H}.
• A concatenation macro q1 ◦ q2 that concatenates each
query in q1’s expansion with each query in q2’s expansion.
For instance, (A B C D) ◦ (E F) expands to the query
A B C D E F.
• An extensionmacro q1 [q2] that takes as input queries q1
and q2 and then creates |q2 | many copies of q1 and extends
each of them with a different element of q2. For example,
(A B C D)[E F] expands to the set of queries {A B C D E,
A B C D F}.
• A power operator (q)n that repeats a query macro q
for n times. For example, (A B C)3 expands to the query
A B C A B C A B C.
• A tag over (q) or [q] applies to every block in q. For
example, (A B)? expands to A? B?.
MBL expressions can be given a formal semantics in terms
of sets of queries (cf. Appendix A). For the purpose of presen-
tation we omit such a formalization and focus on examples.
Example 4.1. For associativity 4, the query ‘@ X _?’ ex-
pands to ‘(A B C D) ◦ X ◦ [A B C D]?’ or, equivalently,
to the set of queries {A B C D X A?, A B C D X B?,
A B C D X C?, A B C D X D?}. This query performs an
initial insertion (i.e., fills the cache with blocks A B C D),
accesses a block X not in the cache, and probes all blocks A, B,
C, and D to determine which one has been replaced after the
cache miss caused by X. This query implements the function
findEvicted in Algorithm 1.
4.2 Architecture
CacheQuery is split into two parts, described next. The
backend is implemented in C as a Linux Kernel Module,
while the frontend is implemented in Python 3.
Frontend. CacheQuery’s frontend expands MBL expres-
sions into sets of queries. The frontend provides two different
execution modes: interactive and batch.
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• The interactive mode provides a REPL shell for execut-
ing queries, modifying configuration options, and dynam-
ically choosing the target cache level and set. We use this
mode as an interface for the learning algorithm
• The batch mode allows to run groups of predefined
queries against different cache sets. This becomes useful for
running batteries of tests, which, for instance, allows us to
identify fixed leader sets (cf. Appendix B).
Furthermore, the frontend uses LevelDB2 to cache query
responses. This improves performance by avoiding repeat-
edly issuing the same queries to the backend.
Backend. CacheQuery’s backend translates arbitrary que-
ries into sequences of memory accesses, generates the ap-
propriate machine code with the corresponding profiling,
executes the code in a low-noise environment, and finally
returns traces of hits and misses. We remark that profiling
happens at the granularity of individual memory accesses,
and it supports performance counters, time stamp counter,
and counting core cycles, as demanded by the user.
The backend is implemented as a Loadable Kernel Module
(LKM). This allows us to use APIs that provide fine-grained
control over operating system details like virtual to physical
address translation, interrupts, and preemption.
config/
l3_sets/
0
..
l2_sets/
l1_sets/
Figure 3. LKM’s virtual file system used by CacheQuery
On load, the LKM allocates several pools of memory (one
per cache level) and maps each memory block into its corre-
sponding cache sets, one per cache level. This facilitates the
address selection during code generation.
The backend provides a virtual file system interface, de-
picted in Figure 3, and all the communication is handled
through read and write operations over virtual files. Specifi-
cally, writing query sequences into the cache set virtual file
triggers the address selection and code generation, whereas
reading from the cache set virtual file executes the generated
code, and returns the sequence of hits and misses.
4.3 Implementation Challenges
In the following we discuss some of the challenges in imple-
menting CacheQuery.
2LevelDB is a fast string key-value storage library: https://github.com/
google/leveldb.
Set Mapping. The first challenge is identifying which mem-
ory addresses are mapped into which cache sets, i.e. which
addresses are congruent. For this, we need to know the num-
ber of cache sets, if these sets are virtually or physically in-
dexed, and how the mapping is performed, i.e., which bits of
the address are used for the mapping. For most architectures,
this information is publicly available [19, 27]. Otherwise, it
is possible to infer it [1] or to dynamically find congruent
addresses [40]. CacheQuery is completely parametric on
the set mapping details, which need only to be determined
once per microarchitecture.
Cache Filtering. When running queries against a low-level
cache, say L3, one needs to make sure that the correspond-
ing memory accesses do not hit higher-level caches such
as L1. To this end, CacheQuery automatically evicts every
accessed block from higher-level caches. For instance, after
accessing a block b in L3, CacheQuery automatically ac-
cesses non-interfering eviction sets (i.e. addresses that are
congruent with b in L2 and L1, but not congruent in L3) to
ensure b’s eviction from L2 and L1.
Code Generation. MBL expressions are first expanded into
sets of queries, which are then dynamically translated into
native code for execution. Each query is implemented as a
function returning a 64-bit mask with the hit/miss pattern
of the profiled memory blocks.
The generated code includes the necessary profiling in-
structions (e.g., rdtsc), the conditional moves to update
the output bit mask, and the additional memory loads to
evict higher cache levels. To support arbitrary queries, we
use immediate load operations3 serialized with memory
fences, rather than the more common pointer chasing tech-
nique [36].
Interferences. To minimize noise during memory interac-
tions, CacheQuery temporarily disables hardware prefetch-
ers, hyper-threading, frequency scaling, and other cores. To
minimize cache interferences, we repeatedly allocate the gen-
erated code until it does not conflict with the target cache
set. Furthermore, the generated code is executed multiple
times to reduce measurement noise.
4.4 Limitations
Currently, CacheQuery only supports data caches (not in-
struction caches) in Intel CPUs. While several parts of our
implementation are architecture-agnostic, adding support
for other architectures, such as AMD and ARM, will require
manual effort. Specifically, one would have to identify the
(possibly undocumented) microarchitectural components
whose state might affect the interaction with the cache, and
manually disable or reset them between queries.
Likewise, CacheQuery currently runs on top of a fully-
fledged Linux kernel. While facilitating development, this
3That is, movabs rax, qword [address] (or in binary 0x48 0xa1 <imm>).
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adds unnecessary complexity and non-determinism. Using a
custom unikernel could provide a better suited environment
for our experiments.
5 Explaining Policies
In this section, we present our approach for synthesizing
explanations of replacement policies in the form of high-level
programs, starting from our automata models.
Policy explanations. We explain replacement policies in
terms of four simpler rules: (a) a promotion rule describing
how the control state is updated whenever there is a cache
hit, (b) an eviction rule describing how to select the cache
line to evict, (c) an insertion rule describing how the control
state is updated whenever there is a cache miss, and (d) a
normalization rule describing how to normalize the control
state before or after a hit or a miss4. We borrow these terms
from policy proposals from the hardware community [21].
Explanation template. The main component of our syn-
thesis approach is a program-level template for explanations,
which is defined in terms of promotion, eviction, insertion,
and normalization rules:
hit(state ,line):: States×Lines→States
state = promote(state ,line)
state = normalize(state ,line)
return state
miss(state):: States→States×Lines
Lines idx = -1
state = normalize(state ,idx)
idx = evict(state)
state[idx] = insert(state ,idx)
state = normalize(state ,idx)
return ⟨state , idx⟩
The template models control states as arrays mapping cache
lines to their so-called ages. The concrete age values (of type
Nat) are left as holes to be instantiated during the synthesis.
Additionally, the template consists of two functions:
The function hit describes how the control state is up-
dated whenever there is a cache hit. The function takes as
input a control state state and a cache line line, updates the
control state using the promotion rule, normalizes it, and
returns the new state.
In contrast, the function miss modifies the control state
in case of a cache miss. The function takes as input a control
state state, normalizes it, detects the cache line idx to evict
using the eviction rule, updates the age of the evicted line us-
ing the insertion rule, and finally normalizes again the ages.
We remark that our templates—with promotion, eviction,
insertion, and normalization rules—formalize well-known
concepts and building blocks used by cache designers [21].
4Normalization is used in some policies to preserve control state invariants.
For example, MRU updates the control state after a hit if all lines have age 0.
Generators. Our template specifies several generators for
the rules. Generators are programs with holes that can be
instantiated during synthesis. Each of the holes can be instan-
tiated with expressions generated from specific grammars,
which constraint the synthesis’ search space. To illustrate,
this is a generator for the promotion rule:
promote(state ,pos):: States×Lines→States
States final = state
if(??{boolExpr(state[pos])}) // Update line
final[pos] = ??{natExpr(state[pos])}
for(i in Lines) // Update rest
if(i , pos ∧
??{boolExpr(state[pos],state[i])})
final[i] = ??{natExpr(state[i])}
return final
The generator takes as input a control state and a cache line
and returns the updated control state. The updated state
is derived by first conditionally modifying the age of the
accessed line and later iterating over the remaining cache
line and conditionally updating them.
All conditions and update expressions are encoded as
holes that refer to template variables. For instance, the hole
??{boolExpr(state[pos],state[i])} can be instantiatedwith
a conjunction of equalities and inequalities that refer to
natural numbers and to state[pos] and state[i], whereas
??{natExpr(state[i])} can be instantiated with an arbitrary
sequence of additions and subtractions that refer to natural
numbers and to state[i].
In general, our grammar generators can refer to constants,
line indices (like pos and i in the promote example), and
ages (like state[pos] in the promote example). We also im-
plement a simplified version of our generators that (1) fix
the normalize rule to the identity function, and (2) restrict
the grammar to only refer to constants and ages.
Constraints. Given a policy P, we construct a formula φP
encoding P’s transition relation −→ in terms of our template’s
hit and miss functions. In our encoding, we associate P’s
control states with logical variables. Concretely, we map
each control state csi in P to a corresponding variable csi .
The constraint φP is defined as follows, where cs1, . . . , csm
are all P ’s control states:
∃cs1, . . . , csm .
∧
1≤i, j≤ |P |∧i,j
csi , csj∧∧
δ (csk,Ln(i))=csl
hit(csk , i) = csl ∧∧
δ (csk,Evct)=csl∧
λ(csk,Evct)=i
miss(csk ) = ⟨csl , i⟩
The existential quantification and the first conjunct ensure
that there arem concrete control states (one per control state
in P). The second and third conjuncts ensure that the hit
and miss functions behave as specified by P.
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Synthesis. To synthesize an explanation for a learned policy
P, we query a syntax-guided synthesis solver for an instance
of our template that satisfies the constraint φP. The solver,
then, either returns a program Prg that instantiates the holes
in the template in away that satisfyφP, or terminates without
finding a model (in case our template cannot represent P).
Example 5.1. Let P be the LRU policy with associativity 2
given in Example 2.2. The constraint φP is as follows:
∃ cs0, cs1. cs0 , cs1 ∧ hit(cs0, 1) = cs0∧
hit(cs0, 0) = cs1 ∧ hit(cs1, 0) = cs1 ∧ hit(cs1, 1) = cs0∧
miss(cs0) = ⟨cs1, 0⟩ ∧ miss(cs1) = ⟨cs0, 1⟩ .
Whenever the solver synthesizes a program that satisfy
the given constraints, we can lift the correctness guarantee
of our approach also to the synthesized program Prg. Indeed,
the solver’s soundness, the template’s determinism, and the
constraint φP ensure that Prg behaves exactly as the learned
policy P on the concrete control states.
Limitations. Although our templates support a large class
of policies (see § 8), they cannot explain arbitrary policies.
For instance, we model control states by associating an age
to each cache line. Hence, policies with a global control state,
such as PLRU, are not supported. Similarly, policies that do
not follow the structure of the promotion, eviction, insertion,
and normalization rules are not supported.
6 Case Study: Learning from
Software-Simulated Caches
This section reports on a case study where we use Polca
to learn well-known replacement policies from software-
simulated caches implementing such policies.
This case study’s goals is to evaluate Polca’s efficiency
and scalability across different classes of replacement poli-
cies, without the overhead introduced by interacting with
real hardware. This case study also provides a basis for com-
paring Polca with prior approaches [1, 33].
Setup. We implemented software-simulated caches (para-
metric in the cache’s associativity) for 7 commonly used
replacement policies: First In First Out (FIFO), Least Recently
Used (LRU), Pseudo-LRU (PLRU) [15], Most Recently Used
(MRU) [26], LRU Insertion Policy (LIP) [31], and HP and
FP variants of Static Re-reference Interval Prediction (SR-
RIP) [21] with 4 ages. We simulate the policies with associa-
tivity ranging from 2 to 16.5 For each policy and associativity,
we use Polca to learn the policy with a timeout of 36 hours.
We record the time needed to learn the automaton and the
learned automaton’s number of states. In our experiments,
we set the test suite depth k to 1 (§ 3.4), which proves suffi-
cient for discovering counterexamples.
5Some policies constraint the possible associativities. For instance, PLRU
policies are well-defined only for associativities that are powers of 2.
Table 2. Learning policies from software-simulated caches
(with 36 hours timeout). We omit FIFO’s intermediate results.
Policy Assoc. # States Time
FIFO
2 2 0 h 0m 0.14 s
. . . . . . . . .
16 16 0 h 0m 0.38 s
LRU
2 2 0 h 0m 0.10 s
4 24 0 h 0m 0.22 s
6 720 0 h 0m 32.70 s
PLRU
2 2 0.10 s
4 8 0.22 s
8 128 1.46 s
16 32768 34 h 18m 25 s
MRU
2 2 0 h 0m 0.10 s
4 14 0 h 0m 0.16 s
6 62 0 h 0m 0.61 s
8 254 0 h 0m 8.82 s
10 1022 0 h 5m 58 s
12 4094 3 h 59m 20 s
LIP
2 2 0 h 0m 0.10 s
4 24 0 h 0m 0.26 s
6 720 0 h 0m 31.97 s
SRRIP-HP
2 12 0 h 0m 0.16 s
4 178 0 h 0m 1.46 s
6 2762 0 h 9m 38 s
SRRIP-FP
2 16 0 h 0m 0.19 s
4 256 0 h 0m 7.27 s
6 4096 2 h 30m 51 s
Results. Table 2 reports the time taken by Polca to learn the
policies and the number of states of the resulting automata.
We highlight the following:
• Except for FIFO, the learning time grows roughly expo-
nentially with associativity. Polca learns FIFO and PLRU up
to associativity 16.
• Prior approaches for permutation-based policies [1]
can learn only FIFO, LRU, and PLRU from our experimental
setup. In contrast, Polca learns policies such like MRU, LIP,
SRRIP-HP, and SRRIP-FP (up to associativities 12, 6, 6, and
6 respectively).
• Prior general purpose approaches [33] learn MRU only
up to associativity 5 and timeout after 72 hours for larger
associativities. In contrast, Polca learns MRU up to associa-
tivity 12 and takes 600milliseconds for associativity 6.
Alternative approaches exist that leverage different heuris-
tics, like random walks, for a deeper counterexample explo-
ration. These approaches generally enable faster hypothesis
refinement, and hence better performance. However, we
opted for a default and deterministic setup, and leave a more
thorough performance evaluation for future work.
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Platform. We run all experiments on a Linux virtual ma-
chine (kernel 4.9.0-8-amd64) with Debian 9.0, Java OpenJDK
v1.8.0_222, running on a Xeon Gold 6154 CPU (with 72 vir-
tual cores), and 64 GB of RAM. We execute the experiments
in parallel using a single virtual core for each policy.
7 Case Study: Learning from Hardware
In this section we report on a case study where we use Polca
and CacheQuery to learn policies from real hardware. The
case study’s goals are (1) to determine whether Polca can
learn policies directly from hardware using CacheQuery as
an interface, and (2) to understand the additional challenges
involved with learning policies from hardware.
Table 3. Processors’ specifications [18, 19, 27].
CPU Cache level Assoc. Slices Sets per slice
i7-4790
(Haswell)
L1 8 1 64
L2 8 1 512
L3 16 4 2048
i5-6500
(Skylake)
L1 8 1 64
L2 4 1 1024
L3 12 8 1024
i7-8550U
(Kaby Lake)
L1 8 1 64
L2 4 1 1024
L3 16 8 1024
7.1 Setup
We analyze the L1, L2, and L3 caches of the Intel i7-4790
(Haswell), i5-6500 (Skylake), and i7-8550U (Kaby Lake) pro-
cessors (see Table 3 for the specifications) using Polca and
CacheQuery. We encounter the following challenges:
• For some policies, Polca does not scale to the large
associativities used in L3 caches. To overcome this, we use
Intel’s CAT technology [17] to virtually reduce L3 associa-
tivity to 4 for the i5-6500 (Skylake) and i7-8550U (Kaby Lake)
processors. CAT is not supported by i7-4790 (Haswell).
• Modern L3 caches often implement adaptive replace-
ment policies [21, 31, 32], where separate groups of leader
cache sets implement distinct replacement policies and the
remaining follower sets switch between these policies dynam-
ically. We only learn leader sets’ policies (cf. Appendix B).
• Our membership oracle Polca (Algorithm 1) relies on
the assumption that traces are executed from a fixed ini-
tial state. In practice, this leads to a bootstrapping problem:
knowing the reset sequence (i.e., a sequence of memory ac-
cesses that brings the cache into a fixed initial state) is a
prerequisite for learning the policy, but computing the re-
set sequence requires knowledge about the policy itself. On
many CPUs, cache sets can be reset by Flush+Refill, i.e., by
invalidating the entire content (with clflush or wbinvd in-
structions) and accessing associativity-many different blocks
(with the ‘@’ MBL macro). For CPUs where this is not the
case, we manually identify reset sequences for each cache
(see Table 4). This is enabled by the fact that incorrect reset
sequences lead to nondeterministic behavior (equal prefixes
produce different outputs), which triggers errors in the learn-
ing algorithm.
Platform. We runCacheQuery on three different machines
equipped with the three processors. Additionally, we run
Polca on the same platform described in § 6. The communi-
cation between Polca and CacheQuery happens over SSH
in a local network.
7.2 Results
Learned policies. Table 4 summarizes the learned policies.
We highlight the following findings:
• For all processors’ L1 caches and for Haswell’s L2 cache,
Polca learns the same policy, that is, a tree-based PLRU
policy. We identified this policy by checking its equivalence
to a manually implemented PLRU automaton. This result
confirms common folklore that Intel processors implement
PLRU in their L1 policy.
• For Skylake’s and Kaby Lake’s L2 caches, Polca learns
a previously undocumented policy. This policy is indicated
as New1 in Table 4, and we further discuss it in § 8.
• For Skylake’s and Kaby Lake’s L3 caches, Polca learns
a previously undocumented policy for the leader sets. This
policy is indicated as New2 in Table 4, and we further discuss
it in § 8. Additionally, we confirm the mapping of Skylake’s
leader sets [40], and we discover that Kaby Lake follows the
same mapping.
• For Haswell’s L3 cache, Polca cannot learn the replace-
ment policy. This is due to (1) i7-4790 not supporting CAT,
and (2) one of the leader sets showing a non-deterministic
behavior.
Cost of learning from hardware. Learning policies from
hardware caches comes with a significant overhead when
compared with learning from software-simulated caches.
This is due to (1) communication overhead between Polca
and CacheQuery, and (2) CacheQuery overhead for code
generation and profiling. We separately analyze the impact
of (1) and (2).
For (1), we compare the time needed to learn a PLRU
policy with associativity 8 from a software-simulated cache
and from CacheQuery where every MBL query hits the
LevelDB cache (i.e., the results of the MBL queries on the
real hardware have been precomputed). Learning from the
software-simulated cache takes 1.46 s (cf. Table 2), while
learning from CacheQuery takes 2247 s, resulting in a 1500x
overhead.
For (2), we measure the time taken to execute a single
MBL query ‘@ M _?’ across cache levels. The averaged query
execution time (across 100 executions on the i5-6500 Skylake
processor) is 16ms on L1, 11ms on L2, and 20ms on L3. We
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Table 4. Results of learning policies from hardware caches. † indicates that the associativity has been virtually reduced using
CAT. The ‘Sets’ column specifies the analyzed cache sets (unless otherwise specified, the findings apply to all slices). F+R
denotes the use of Flush+Refill to reset the cache set state.
CPU Level Assoc. Sets States Policy Reset Seq.
i7-4790
(Haswell)
L1 8 0 − 63 128 PLRU @ @
L2 8 0 − 511 128 PLRU F+R
L3 16 512 − 575 (only for slice 0) – – –768 − 831 (only for slice 0) – – –
i5-6500
(Skylake)
L1 8 0 − 63 128 PLRU F+R
L2 4 0 − 1023 160 New1 D C B A @
L3 4† 0 33 132 165 264 297 396 429 528 561 660 693 792 825 924 957 175 New2 F+R
i7-8550U
(Kaby Lake)
L1 8 0 − 63 128 PLRU F+R
L2 4 0 − 1023 160 New1 D C B A @
L3 4† 0 33 132 165 264 297 396 429 528 561 660 693 792 825 924 957 175 New2 F+R
remark that learning the PLRU policy with associativity 8
requires more than 50’000 MBL queries.
8 Case Study: Synthesizing Explanations
This section reports on a case study where we use the syn-
thesis approach from § 5 to derive policy explanations for
the automata learned in §§ 6–7. This case study’s goals are
(1) to evaluate if our approach can explain the replacement
policies learned in §§ 6–7, and (2) to determine whether the
synthesized explanations can help in understanding previ-
ously undocumented policies.
8.1 Setup
We encoded our template (and all rules generators) from § 5
in Sketch [34]. We use Sketch to synthesize explanations for
all the policies from § 6 (i.e., FIFO, LRU, PLRU, MRU, LIP,
SRRIP-HP, and SRRIP-IP) and for the undocumented policies
New1 and New2 from § 7. In our experiments, we fix the
associativity to 4.
For all policies, we synthesize explanations using Sketch6,
and record the time needed to synthesize an explanation that
satisfies our constraints. During synthesis, we bound both
the size of natural numbers and the recursion depth of our
grammar generators. For associativity 4, we choose a size
bound of 4 and recursion depth bound of 2. We explore the
synthesis space incrementally until we find a solution or the
space is exhausted. For each policy, we first try synthesizing
an explanation using the simplified template from § 6 (which
we refer to as Simple template), and if we cannot synthesize
a solution, then we try using the more general template from
§ 6 (which we refer to as Extended template).
Platform. We run the experiments on the same platform as
in § 6 and use Sketch v1.7.5, with a single thread.
6 Sketch uses a random seed to explore the search space. Hence, Sketch
might synthesize different explanations that satisfy the constraints. In our
experiments, we fix the seed to --slv-seed 1337.
8.2 Results
Table 5 summarizes the results of our synthesis approach.
We highlight the following findings:
1. Our approach successfully explains the FIFO, LRU, and
LIP policies using the Simple template in less than 5 s.
2. Our approach synthesizes explanations for the MRU,
SRRIP-HP, SRRIP-FP, New1, and New2 policies using the
Extended template. The synthesis time varies (from ~40 s for
MRU to ~4.5 days for SRRIP-HP), but it is roughly correlated
with the number of states.
3. Our current templates do not encompass PLRU. The
main reason is that PLRU uses a tree-based data structure
as global control state, rather than a local, per-line control
state as in our templates. Supporting tree-based policies
would require modifying our templates to handle a global
state and extending our grammars with operators for the
traversal of tree-based structures. Synthesis, however, did
not successfully terminate in our initial experiments for this
enhanced template. Thus, we opted in favor of simpler and
more general templates that allow us to explain a broader
set of policies in reasonable time, even at the cost of not
supporting special tree-based global policies like PLRU.
Explaining New1 and New2. Sketch successfully synthe-
size explanations for the previously undocumented policies
New1 and New2 from § 7. Below we provide a high-level
description of the policies. We include the complete synthe-
sized programs in Appendix C.
The New1 policy is defined by:
• The initial control state is {3, 3, 3, 0}.
• Promote: Set the accessed line’s age to 0.
• Evict: Select the first line, starting from left, whose
age is 3.
• Insert: Set the evicted line’s age to 1.
• Normalize:After a hit or a miss, while there is no line
with age 3, increase the age of all lines by 1 except for
the just accessed/evicted line.
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Table 5. Synthesizing explanations for policies (of associa-
tivity 4). In the Simple template, normalize is fixed to the
identity function and the grammar for expressions is simpler.
In contrast, the Extended template supports the normalize
rule and has a more expressive expression grammar.
Policy States Template Execution Time
FIFO 4 Simple 0 h 0m 0.18 s
LRU 24 Simple 0 h 0m 0.81 s
PLRU 8 — —
LIP 24 Simple 0 h 0m 4.36 s
MRU 14 Extended 0 h 0m 39.80 s
SRRIP-HP 178 Extended 105 h 28m 30 s
SRRIP-FP 256 Extended 48 h 30m 25 s
New1 160 Extended 9 h 36m 9 s
New2 175 Extended 26 h 4m 22 s
The New2 policy is defined by:
• The initial control state is {3, 3, 3, 3}.
• Promote: If the accessed line has age 1 set it to 0,
otherwise set it to 1.
• Evict: Select the first line, starting from left, whose
age is 3.
• Insert: Set the evicted line’s age to 1.
• Normalize: After a hit or miss, while there is no line
with age 3, increase all lines by 1.
In contrast to the automata models, our high-level repre-
sentation allow us to compare the previously undocumented
policies with known ones. Concretely, both New1 and New2
are variants of the SRRIP-HP policy, defined in [21]. The
main difference appears in the normalization rule, where
SRRIP-HP normalizes the ages (by increasing all ages by 1
while there is no line with age 3) only before a miss.
9 Discussion
Threats to validity.
• Hardware interface:CacheQuery employs severalmech-
anisms (§ 4.3) to eliminate noise and to provide an interface to
a cache whose state is determined by explicit memory loads.
However, a replacement policy could take into account hints
from hardware prefetchers, different cache levels, or other
partitions created by CAT [24]. We suppress these effects by
design and thus potentially learn a restricted state machine.
• Automata learning: Our automata learning approach
provides precise correctness guarantees (Corollary 3.4). These
guarantees rely on two assumptions: (1) the policy under
learning is a deterministic finite state machine, and (2) the
test suite of depth k is large enough to find counterexamples
during the learning. Violating any of these assumptions may
result in an incorrect policy.
Scalability. Our approach can successfully learn policies
up to associativity 16 (for software simulators, see § 6) and
8 (for hardware caches, see § 7). Polca is key to make au-
tomata learning scale to this extent since it exploits data-
independence symmetries to significantly reduce the learn-
ing state-space. For many policies, however, scalability is still
limited by the state-space’s exponential growth with respect
to associativity. Potential paths forward include identifying
and exploiting further symmetries to reduce the state-space,
learning abstractions rather than full models, or giving up
on the correctness guarantees. Due to its modularity, our ap-
proach is well-suited for integrating such variants (and future
improvements) in automata learning and program synthesis.
10 Related Work
Model learning. For related work on automata learning
techniques for black-box systems we refer the interested
reader to Vaandrager’s survey paper [37].
Reverse-engineering cache policies. Abel and Reineke [1]
design an efficient algorithm for learning permutation base
replacement policies, a class of policies that include LRU,
PLRU, and FIFO. They use an adhoc approach to reverse en-
gineer two variants of PLRU that employ randomization [2].
Guillem Rueda’s master thesis [33] studies how register au-
tomata learning can serve to learn a broader class of replace-
ment policies, in comparison to permutation based policies,
including MRU. This is an interesting and novel approach,
however, their method does not scale in practice (§ 6).
Wong [42] notices the use of adaptive policies in Intel’s Ivy
Bridge, and tries to identify the new implemented policies
guided by recent papers [21, 32], without complete success.
In concurrentwork, Abel and Reineke extend nanoBench [3,
4] to reverse engineer cache replacement policies. In con-
trast to our approach, they proceed by producing random se-
quences and comparing the results from hardware against a
pool of ~300 software-simulated caches. While this approach
is less general and the results lack correctness guarantees, in
practice, it proves highly efficient and accurate. In fact, we
are able to validate several of their findings.
Security. Rowhammer.js [12] tests thousands of eviction
strategies, memory access patterns with high eviction rate, in
order to identify efficient strategies to mount a rowhammer
attack from a web browser. Recent attacks [13, 24, 43] show
how detailed knowledge about the replacement policy state
can leak information, in contrast to the common content
based leak. Similarly, Briongos et al. [8] exploit a new cache
side-channel attack leveraging changes in the policy state to
bypass mechanisms based onmonitoring of cachemisses. For
this, they attempt to explain the behavior of the replacement
policy on several modern Intel CPUs. While their description
is not completely accurate, it is enough to prove their attack.
Detailed policy models, such as the ones we provide, en-
able one to systematically compute optimal eviction strate-
gies, and to unveil new sophisticated cache attacks.
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Custom kernels. Recent research projects have developed
custom kernels and hypervisors for specialized tasks that
require extremely high performance, precise measurements,
or access to privileged modes. These environments provide
complete control over the hardware improving testing and
reproducibility. Some examples include angryOS [25], which
has been used for reverse engineering microcode, or Sushi
Roll [14], a highly deterministic kernel, initially designed for
fuzzing, converted into a cycle-by-cycle CPU introspection
tool.
Implementing interfaces as CacheQuery on a custom ker-
nel can provide a better environment for high performance
and predictability, ultimately enabling the use of learning
methods for other undocumented microarchitectural com-
ponents, like prefetchers, branch predictors, or data buffers.
11 Conclusions
We presented a practical end-to-end solution for learning
hardware cache replacement policies. In our experiments we
were successful in inferring human-readable descriptions of
cache replacement policies used in recent Intel processors,
including 2 previously undocumented policies.
Our approach relies on two contributions that enable us
to tackle the problem using off-the-shelf techniques for au-
tomata learning and program synthesis: (1) CacheQuery,
a tool that provides a clean interface for interacting with
hardware memory caches, and (2) Polca, an algorithm that
provides a direct interface to the replacement policy by ab-
stracting from the cache content.
Both our contributions are independent and ready to use
in alternative workflows, such as advanced learning ap-
proaches [11, 22] or manual analysis.
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A MemBlockLang Syntax and semantics
Here, we present the syntax and semantics of the MBL language. In the following, we assume given an ordered set of blocks
B = {a1,a1, . . . ,am} and a value n ∈ N representing the cache’s associativity such that n < m.
Syntax. The syntax of MBL is given in Figure 4.
Basic Types
(Blocks) b ∈ {a1,a1, . . . ,am}
(Tags) t ∈ {?, !}
(Numbers) k ∈ N
Syntax
(Queries) q := ε | b | (b)t | q1 · q2
(Expressions) s := (q) | {q1, . . . ,ql } | @ | _ | (s)t |
s1 ◦ s2 | (s1)[s2] | (s)k
Figure 4.MBL syntax
Semantics. The semantics of an MBL expression s consists of a set of queries JsK and it is defined as follows:
• JqK = {q} where q is a query.
• J{q1, . . . ,ql }K = {q1, . . . ,ql } where {q1, . . . ,ql } is a set of queries.
• J@K = {a1 · a2 · . . . · an}.
• J_K = {a1,a2, . . . ,an}.
• Js?K = {a1? · a2? · . . . · ak? | a1 · a2 · . . . · ak ∈ JsK} where s is an MBL expression such that all queries in JsK do not have
tags.
• Js!K = {a1! · a2! · . . . · ak ! | a1 · a2 · . . . · ak ∈ JsK} where s is an MBL expression such that all queries in JsK do not have
tags.
• Js1 ◦ s2K = {s · s ′ | s ∈ Js1K ∧ s ′ ∈ Js2K} where s1, s2 are MBL expressions.
• Js1[s2]K = {s · a | s ∈ Js1K ∧ ∃s2 ∈ Js2K, i ∈ N. s2[i] = a} where s1, s2 are MBL expressions.
• J(s)kK = {s1 · s2 · . . . · sk | ∧1≤i≤k si ∈ JsK}, where s is an MBL expression and k ∈ N.
• J(s)K = JsK, where s is an MBL expression.
B Adaptive Policies and Leader Sets
Henry Wong [42] identifies an adaptive L3 cache on Intel’s Ivy Bridge processors and describes heuristics for detecting the
existence of leader sets.
In a similar way, we use CacheQuery to run several thrashing queries (i.e., access patterns with a working set that does not
fit into the cache and degenerates performance) on a per set basis, obtaining the following results:
• Haswell i7-4790: sets 512 − 575 in slice 0 implement a fixed policy susceptible to thrashing. Sets 768 − 831 in slice 0
implement a fixed thrash resistant policy (that seems to be not deterministic). In contrast, the rest of the cache sets
follow the policy producing less misses.
• Skylake i5-6500: cache sets whose indexes satisfy ((((set & 0x3e0) ≫ 5) ⊕ (set & 0x1f)) = 0x0) ∧ ((set & 0x2) = 0x0)
implement a fixed policy susceptible to thrashing (i.e., policy New2). The rest seem to use an adaptive policy that behaves
in a non-deterministic way.
• Kaby Lake i7-8550U: we observe the same behavior and set selection than on Skylake i5-6500.
On Haswell, we confirm previous results reported in [8]. However, we remark that leader sets are only present in slice
0. It is also worth mentioning that the ranges seem to be selected by comparing the index bits with some fixed constants:
((set & 0x7c0) ≫ 6) = 0x8 and ((set & 0x7c0) ≫ 6) = 0xc, respectively.
Previous work [40] identified sets with a fixed policy on Skylake, and argued that leader set influence did not cross slices.
We complete this knowledge, including the description for Kaby Lake, and expose that adaptivity has effects across different
slices, i.e. a single cache set leader producing lots of hits can affect all the follower sets in the cache.
We also report the following observations regarding the adaptive policy implemented in the rest of the L3 cache sets in
Skylake and Kaby Lake:
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• First, we observe another group of sets —those whose indexes satisfy ((((set & 0x3e0) ≫ 5) ⊕ (set & 0x1f)) =
0x1f) ∧ ((set & 0x2) = 0x2)— that change at a different rate than the majority.
• Second, it is possible to control the adaptive policies in 2 ways, by only interacting with the thrash-vulnerable fixed
sets: (1) heavily thrashing the fixed sets makes the adaptive policy become more thrash resistant, i.e., @ M a M? always
produces a miss; (2) continuously producing hits on the fixed sets makes them tend towards the New2 policy.
We remark that this interaction needs to happen concurrently, which might indicate a small counter refereeing the set dueling
mechanism. If the unknown adaptive policy is inspired by DRRIP [21], it could behave deterministically when completely
saturated. However, we have not yet been able to learn it.
Interestingly, the set selection uncovered for Skylake and Kaby Lake processors is very similar to that in [31], which
augments our confidence in the abovementioned explanation.
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C Previously Undocumented Policies
Figure 5 shows a cleaned-up version, with minor variable renaming and layout adjustments, of the synthesized explanations
describing the 2 previously undocumented cache replacement policies from § 7.
int[4] s0 = {3,3,3,0};
int[4]hit State (int[4] state , int pos)
int[4] final = state
// Promotion
final[pos] = 0
// Normalization
// is there a block with age 3?
bit found = 0
for(int j = 0; j < 4; j = j + 1)
if(!found)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(!found && final[i] == 3)
found = 1
// If not, increase all ages
// except promoted one
if(!found)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(i != pos)
final[i] = final[i] + 1
return final
int miss Idx (int[4] state)
// Replace first block with age 3
// starting from the left
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(state[i] == 3)
return i
int[4] miss State (int[4] state)
int[4] final = state
// Insertion
int replace = miss Idx(state);
final[replace] = 1
// Normalization
// Is there a block with age 3?
bit found = 0
for(int j = 0; j < 4; j = j + 1)
if(!found)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(!found && final[i] == 3)
found = 1
// If not, increase all ages
// except inserted one
if(!found)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(replace != i)
final[i] = final[i] + 1
return final
(a) Sketch solution for New1 undocumented policy.
int[4] s0 = {3,3,3,3};
int[4] hit State (int[4] state)
int[4] final = state
// Promotion
if(final[pos] < 2 && final[pos] == 1)
final[pos] = 0
else if (state[pos] > 1)
final[pos] = 1
// Normalization
// Is there a block with age 3?
bit found = 0
for(int j = 0; j < 4; j = j + 1)
if(found == 0)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(! found0 && final[i] == 3)
found = 1
// If not, increase all ages
if(!found)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
final[i] = final[i] + 1
return final
int miss Idx (int[4] state)
// Replace first block with age 3
// starting from the left
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(state[i] == 3)
return i
int[4] miss State (int[4] state)
int[4] final = state
// Insertion
int replace = miss Idx(state);
final[replace] = 1;
// Normalization
// Is there a block with age 3?
bit found = 0
for(int j = 0; j < 4; j = j + 1)
if(!found)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
if(!found && final[i] == 3)
found = 1
// If not, increase all ages
if(!found)
for(int i = 0; i < 4; i = i + 1)
final[i] = final[i] + 1
return final
(b) Sketch solution for New2 undocumented policy.
Figure 5. Synthesized high-level programs for previously undocumented replacement policies using the Extended template.
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